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1. Introduction 
On Monday, December 5th, 2011, the Italian Government presented a reform that aims 
not only to restore a balanced budget in 2013, but also to stimulate company 
capitalization, by means of the so-called “Aiuto alla Crescita Economica” (Aid to 
Economic Growth) instrument. This relief shares the acronym and the main characteristics 
of the British ACE.  
Under both systems, the allowance is calculated by applying an imputation (or notional) 
rate to the equity invested into the company.1 Ordinary return, approximating the 
opportunity cost of new equity capital, is exempt, while exceeding income is taxed at the 
corporate level. Therefore, by ensuring the deduction of the imputed income of equity 
capital, ACE reduces or even eliminates the tax advantage of debt finance, thereby 
encouraging firm capitalization.2 
According to the Italian Government, ACE has two aims: 1) it is expected to boost Italy’s 
economic growth through a reduction of firm tax liabilities; 2) it is designed to enhance 
capital structure of Italian companies.3 It is worth noting that this provision is in line with 
both the European Commission’s and the International Monetary Fund’s 
recommendations, which stress the importance of implementing tax devices aimed at 
discouraging companies’ excessively high leverage and therefore, reducing systemic risk.  
In this article, we have first described the new ACE-type system and calculated the 
effective marginal tax rates (EMTRs) under full equity- and debt-finance. We then 
estimated the effect of this tax relief on firms’ leverage. To do so, we used a large and 
representative sample of Italian firms. Our preferred estimate of leverage elasticity to ACE 
is negative and statistically significant, equal to -0.064. This means that an overall increase 
in the benefit by 50% of the initial ACE benefit (such that the ACE/Sales ratio goes from 0.14% 
up to 0.21%) is estimated to change leverage by -3.2%, on average. Although this effect 
varies according to area, size and sectors, the ACE relief is in any case expected to 
                                               
1 This tax provision is contained in a comprehensive fiscal reform aimed at reaching a balanced 
public budget in 2013. For further details on its characteristics and overall effects see, e.g., Arachi 
et al. (2012). 
2 The idea of taxing above-normal income is not new: during the first world war, many countries 
involved in that conflict introduced devices aimed at taxing "war-profiteering", that is profits that 
exceeded normal peace-time profits. See, e.g., Stamp (1917). 
3 As stressed by the Government, Italian companies have a “relatively high” leverage (about 1.5, 
versus 0.6 in France and 0.7 in Spain, BACH data — industry trade). Moreover, they are subject to 
an effective tax rate which is well above the EU average (i.e., 27.4 percent against an EU average 
of 21.8 per cent, see EUROSTAT). According to Mr. Monti’s Government, therefore, the 
introduction of ACE will both reduce the tax burden and encourage a rebalancing of firm capital 
structure. 
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encourage company capitalization, therefore consistently reducing default risk. The 
reduction of systemic risk may be a necessary condition to reach the Government’s second 
target, i.e., boosting economic growth (the Achille’s heel of the Italian economy). 
Section 2 of the paper describes the main characteristics of an ACE-type system and 
summarizes the international debate on this instrument. Section 3 provides a discussion of 
the Italian case, with reference to the main changes over the last decade. Section 4 
discusses the econometric method and the estimation results. Section 5 reports some 
robustness checks of our results. Section 6 concludes. 
 
2. ACE taxation throughout the world 
According to the European Commission (2008), Italian firms are more exposed to debt 
than other European companies. Worry about this exposure has been voiced not only by 
the European Commission, but also by the IMF (2009).4 Both institutions have shown that 
this excessive debt exposure has been favoured by existing tax rules: by guaranteeing the 
(either partial or total) deductibility of interest on debt, many systems encourage debt 
finance, thus creating under-capitalization and raising default risk. To eliminate this 
distortion, both the IMF and the European Commission have illustrated various options. 
As such, the IMF analyzed certain mechanisms aimed at giving an incentive to self 
financing. Finally, it proposed the introduction of an Allowance for Corporate Equity 
(ACE) instrument, which had also been discussed previously by the Institute for Fiscal 
Studies (IFS, 1991).5 Similarly, in a report prepared for the European Commission in 2008, 
a group of experts6 analyzed a few alternative proposals including:  
• Introducing a mechanism similar to ACE; 
                                               
4 The IMF report (2009) states: "Tax distortions are likely to have encouraged excessive leveraging 
and other problems evident in the financial market crisis. These effects have been little explored, 
but are potentially macro-relevant. Taxation can result, for example, in a net subsidy to borrowing 
of hundreds of basis points, raising debt-equity ratios and vulnerabilities from capital inflows" (p. 
1). The IMF report also argues that: “Given the large potential macroeconomic damage from 
excess leverage, including balance of payment effects, it is hard to see why–as now is often the 
case– debt finance should be systematically tax-favoured” (p. 12). 
5 According to the IFS proposal, the opportunity cost of finance should be equal to the default-free 
interest rate, thereby making the Government "a sleeping partner in the risky project, sharing in 
the return, but also sharing some of the risk" (Devereux and Freeman, 1991, p. 8). Devereux and 
Freeman (1991) point out that, in present value terms, Brown (1948) cash-flow tax and the ACE 
tax are equivalent. This means that ACE does not distort investment decisions. 
6 AAVV. (2008), Study on Effects of Tax Systems on the Retention of Earnings and the Increase of 
Own Equity, edited for the European Commission (Team Leader: Jean Albert; contract 
SI2.ICNPROCE009493100). 
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• Passing a law which would guarantee the benefits of using reinvested profits for a 
firm.  
Even if these experts are doubtful about the effectiveness of ACE (as it has been used very 
rarely in real situations), they believe that solutions need to be found to stimulate the 
recapitalization of firms. As such, both the European Commission and the IMF agree 
about the problem of excessive corporate debt, while there are still differences of opinion 
about solutions to this problem. 
It is worth noting that ACE-type systems had already been implemented in Croatia 
between 1994 and 2001 (see Keen and King, 2002). Moreover, dual tax systems were 
introduced not only in the Nordic countries and Italy but also in other countries, such as 
Austria, Belgium and Brazil (see Eggert and Genser, 2005, Gérard, 2006, Klemm, 2006).7 
Contrary to a cash-flow tax therefore, policy-makers aiming at implementing a dual tax 
system were able to rely on previous experience. 
Recently, in an IMF working paper, De Mooij (2011) returned to this topic, pointing out 
that most countries guarantee a tax advantage for debt. He stated that this discrimination 
is becoming ever more difficult to justify, given the present state of affairs. In particular, 
he pointed out that the costs of this discriminatory treatment of financing sources “are 
larger, possibly much larger than we thought” (p. 3). For this reason, he proposed using 
ACE. He estimated that, if the benefits of ACE were applied to the whole net internal 
equity of largest countries, its cost would be about 0.5% of GNP. According to other 
authors (see, e.g., Griffith et al., 2010), he then proposed a gradual approach aimed at 
ensuring that ACE benefits only new wealth. This is exactly what happens with the Italian 
ACE. 
 
3. The Italian ACE 
The new ACE system shares some characteristics with the Italian Dual Income Tax (DIT), 
in force from 1998 to 2003. As shown in Box 1, under both regimes, profit is split into two 
components, i.e., ordinary and above-normal income. Unlike DIT, which taxed ordinary 
income at a lower rate, ordinary income is exempt under ACE.8 
                                               
7 See also Fehr and Wiegard (2003) and Keuschnigg and Dietz (2007), who proposed the 
introduction of an ACE-type system in Germany and Switzerland, respectively. More recently, 
Griffith et al. (2010) have proposed the introduction of a dual income tax in the UK. They have 
also pointed out that if the British Government preferred to move “towards a consumption-based 
personal tax, the equivalent of such a system could be implemented by exempting the normal 
return to saving from tax at the personal level, just as the ACE allowance exempts the normal 
return at the corporate level” (p. 917).  
8 For further details on the Italian DIT see Bordignon et al. (1999, 2001).  
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Box 1: The Italian Dual Income Tax (1998-2003). 
Under the Italian DIT, a gradual approach was implemented. Indeed, the favourable tax 
treatment involved only new subscriptions of capital and retained earnings, rather than the 
whole equity capital. The starting time was 1996, when the reform was originally presented 
by the Government. Thus the DIT benefit was nil at the beginning and increased over 
time as new subscriptions and retained earnings from 1996 onwards led to an accumulation 
of equity capital. In doing so, it ensured a "soft" move towards the final regime, under 
which all equity capital would have enjoyed DIT benefit. This gradual implementation was 
necessary to keep a close eye on public accounts, at a time when Italy was trying its best 
to gain access to the first stage of the European Monetary Union. For this reason, the 
average tax rate could not be less than 27%. As we pointed out, the Italian DIT tax was 
abolished in 2003. When the centre-right Government came to power in 2001, the attitude 
towards DIT radically changed. The imputation rate was almost immediately aligned to 
the rate of legal interest, and thus halved (declining from 6% to 3.5% first and then to 
3%). Furthermore, only equity increases until June 30th, 2001 were relevant to calculate 
the incentive. Cutting imputation rate and "freezing" the benefit were a clear signal of the 
future abandonment of the DIT, which occurred at the end of 2003. 
Despite these limitations, related to the way it was designed and not to the instrument 
itself, its introduction had a significant effect. Bontempi et al. (2003) showed that, in a 
sample of about 12,000 companies, the debt/liability ratio was reduced on average by 
0.21%. This result is particularly significant, because estimates were limited to the 1998-99 
period. Similar results were also found in Bernasconi et al. (2005), who then urged 
policymakers to reconsider the elimination of the DIT system. 
 
Under the ACE regime, the imputation rate used to calculate ordinary income is equal to 
3%. Subsequently, it will be determined by the Minister of Economy and Finance (to be 
issued no later than January 31st of each year) and will be in line with the average return 
of public bonds, increased by three percentage points. 
As pointed out, the ACE benefit will be applied to new equity, the starting level being net 
wealth existing on December 31st, 2010 (which is the first year of application). If the 
notional value of the ACE return exceeds the total amount of income, it will be deductible 
against income in the subsequent tax periods.9 
In the first year of application, the ACE base is equal to the existing equity at the end of 
the previous year, less the profit earned during that year. This starting value is increased 
by the shareholders’ new cash contributions and retained profit. However, non-available 
                                               
9 Suppose for example that a company’s equity is 1 Million Euros in the current year: the 
Ace relief will then be equal to 3 per cent of the equity times the existing corporate income 
tax rate (27,5 per cent), i.e., 0,275•(0,03•1.000.000) = 8.250 Euros. This relief can be 
either deducted from gross tax liability now (if it exceeds 8.250 Euros) or carried forward 
(if it is lower). If, for instance, gross tax liability is 5.250, the exceeding 3.000 Euros will be 
carried forward and deducted in future years. 
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reserves (e.g., due to the revaluation of a firm’s asset value) are not accounted for (see Box 
2).10  
It is worth noting that ACE applies not only to corporations but also to individual firms 
and limited partnerships. Although the treatment of individual firms and limited 
partnerships has to be ruled by a forthcoming decree of the Minister of Economy and 
Finance, the inclusion of all these kinds of business is an important measure, as it ensures 
neutrality in terms of organizational form.  
 
Box 2: The Italian ACE (according to law 22 December 2011, n. 214 and Decree by the 
Ministry of Economy and Finance dated 14 March 2012). 
The Ace base 
The increase of capital relevant to the facility comes from the algebraic sum of positive and 
negative elements. Positive elements are cash contributions (capital increases, payments to fund 
lost) and allocations of profit to reserves, except non-distributable reserves. The decree also 
assigns shareholders’ waiver of repayment of loans to positive items. Negative elements are 
voluntary distributions to shareholders (distribution of retained earnings, return of capital, 
allocation of assets) as well as some reductions due to anti-avoidance rules. 
The ACE base besides includes profits allocated to the reserve profit used to cover losses or 
carried forward. In order to widen the Ace base, profit made in 2010 is also included. No surplus 
fund arising from differences on exchange rates are included. 
Eligibility 
ACE is applied not only to corporations but also to sole proprietors and partnerships. However, 
this benefit is not granted to bankrupt firms; companies under either compulsory liquidation or 
extraordinary administration (this rule can be applied only to large companies). 
Timing 
Contributions in cash detect since they are physically carried out. Therefore, in the year of 
payment, cash is considered according to a pro-rata basis criterion (i.e., if cash payments are 
received July the 1st , only one half of it matters).  
Anti-avoidance rule 
To avoid “cascade effects” if shareholders inject new equity in a company and this money is 
again transferred to a subsidiary, the contribution in cash at the hand of A is sterilized and the 
benefit is only guaranteed to B. By doing so, the law aims at eliminating the duplication of tax 
reliefs, especially in groups, against a single injection of capital or “refreshing” of the old capital 
with operations considered to be elusive (as intercompany purchases of companies). 
 
As already pointed out, the ACE relief is aimed at reducing or eliminating the tax 
advantage of debt. To show this, Figure 1 shows the dynamics of the effective marginal 
tax rate (EMTR) under both full equity- and debt-finance over the 1998-2012 period 
(calculations are available in Appendix 2). For simplicity, personal taxes are not 
considered. As can be seen, the EMTR under equity-finance shows a sharp increase, due to 
repealing DIT.  
                                               
10 Similarly, equity is reduced in the event of: equity distribution, purchases of investment in 
subsidiaries, purchases of companies or business units. 
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In 2006 it went below 50% because of the corporate tax rate cut (from 33 to 27.5%). As 
can be seen, the introduction of ACE in 2012 led to a dramatic cut in EMTR. However, 
the tax advantage was reduced but not eliminated: this is due to the fact that the ACE 
imputation rate was now 3% namely, about one half of market interest rates.  
 
Figure 1 — The effective marginal tax rate under equity and debt finance. 
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4. Estimated effects of the ACE relief 
Due to budget constraints, the Italian Government decided not to extend this provision to 
the entire equity stock. According to Arachi et al. (2012), however, an ACE allowance 
proportional to the net wealth stock would have been affordable, as it would cost about 4 
billion Euros (i.e., about 0.25% of GDP). In this case, the average effective tax rate would 
have been reduced by more than 9%. 
Despite this gradual approach, we can expect that the EMTR cut would have a beneficial 
effect in terms of capitalization. In order to estimate this effect, we examined a sample of 
Italian firms, most of them being limited liability companies. There are 109,175 firms in 
the sample, about 10% of the overall limited-liability Italian firms, selected with a 
stratified method, which delivered a representative sample (see Appendix 1 for sample 
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selection and description). Each firm is observed at least for two consecutive years over the 
time interval 2006-2010. Thus, the total number of observations is 445,857 (see Appendix 
1). Table 1 shows some of the descriptive statistics of our sample. It is worth noting that 
firms differ in terms of size, shareholder funds and ACE benefit due to new equity 
injections. The correlation matrix of the main variables used in the regressions is also 
reported. 
 
Table 1. Descriptive statistics and correlation matrix.  
 All Profit Loss 
 Mean St. Dev. Mean St. Dev. Mean St. Dev. 
Leverage 0.69 0.308 0.66 0.274 0.75 0.362 
ln-Sales 11.35 4.633 12.46 3.479 9.07 5.736 
ln-ACE benefit 5.69 1.658 5.82 1.628 5.42 1.688 
Sales (€Th) 3568.62 177091 4487.55 215538.9 1685.51 20521.43 
ACE benefit (€) 5108.83 194771.1 6102.51 235100.6 3072.53 49021.53 
Shareholders funds (€Th) 1309.00 41566.14 1621.10 50410.76 669.43 7751.25 
Debt (€Th) 2960.35 153025.8 3443.73 186339.1 1969.77 15750.39 
Total assets (€Th) 4608.04 221054 5489.21 269177.9 2802.29 22688.21 
       
Correlation matrix Leverage ln-Sales     
Leverage 1      
Ln-Sales 0.052*** 1     
Ln-ACE benefit -0.254*** 0.286*** 1    
note: Sales are reported in thousand of euro. ACE benefit is reported in euro.  
Statistics are based on 445,857 observations for 109,175 firms over 5 years.  
Pair wise correlation coefficients are all statistically significant at 1% level. 
  
 
The firms’ leverage is the ratio between the sum of current and non-current liabilities, over 
total assets.11 On average, it is 69% of total assets. Loss-making firms have a higher 
leverage (75%) than profitable ones (66%), although the dispersion is higher. Not 
surprisingly, profit-making firms profited from a higher ACE benefit. As will be shown, 
however, for loss-making firms an increase in the ACE relief by an equal amount will 
ensure a greater benefit in terms of leverage decrease. Of course, ACE benefit, which 
ensures a cut in the effective tax ratio (tax liability on profit), frees up resources and 
according to the Government, could stimulate corporate activity. 
In this article however, we have only focused on the first target, i.e., the expected decrease 
in leverage caused by ACE. To estimate this effect we opted for the following general 
(reduced) form equation: 
itiititit ACExy εαδβκ ++++= ~' , (1) 
                                               
11
 See for example Miniaci, Panteghini, Parisi (2012) for a definition.  
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where the dependent variable ity  is the leverage ratio.
12 Index i refers to the firms, t to 
year. itx
~  is a vector of firm variables, that is geographical position, size, sector of 
production, or time-variant like age and whether reporting a profit/loss in the current 
year, i.e. I(EBIT>0)=1 for profit, I(EBIT>0)=0 for loss. Time dummies are included in all 
regressions. The variable ACE is the log of the ratio between ACE benefit and total assets; 
ACE benefit is calculated according to De Mooij (2011) by considering that loss-making 
firms enjoy a lower benefit due to carry forward devices. This reduces the ACE benefit for 
loss-making firms by 50%. Details are provided in Table 2. Finally, iα  represents all other 
unobservable individual effects, and itε  is an idiosyncratic error term, assumed 
uncorrelated with the unobserved and observed characteristics.13 
 
Table 2. ACE benefit formula 
Profitable firms 0,275*i*base ACE 
Loss-making firms 0,5*0,275*i*base ACE 
note: 0.275 is the statutory corporate income tax rate; i is the imputation rate; the ACE base is equal  
to the increase in net wealth observed since 2010. 
 
 
In our regressions, we use both Fixed Effects and pooled-OLS (as well as random effects 
for a specification test) types of estimator, given that pure OLS should be upward biased if 
fixed effects are present in the sample and positively correlated with the other 
characteristics, or downward biased otherwise.14 Pooled-OLS allowed us to condition the 
elasticity estimates on various firm fixed characteristics (i.e., location, size, sector) plus a 
set of interaction terms between the ACE variable and fixed characteristics, useful to run a 
Wald test of parameter stability, as illustrated in Table 3, column 4. Within-group Fixed 
Effects estimator allowed us to take care of any potential fixed effect correlation with the 
explanatory variables itx
~ , but it canceled out time-invariant characteristics. To estimate 
the elasticity of leverage to ACE in the sub-populations with same characteristics, we need 
to apply the within-group estimator to sub-samples (Table 3, column 2). Notice that the 
dummy I(EBIT>0) changes over time; however in order to define the subpopulation of 
profitable firms (and losing profit firms), we decided to build two groups in the following 
                                               
12
 Bernasconi, Marenzi, Pagani (2005), Miniaci, Panteghini, Parisi (2012), Gurcharan (2010), among others, use similar 
reduced-form approaches in the estimates. See also note 17. 
13
 We will alternatively use the Fixed Effects within-group estimation method and the Random Effects method, and run 
a Hausman test of specification. In the Random Effects method, we also drop the assumption of independence between 
α and x, and correct for this bias (see Wooldridge, 2002). We furthermore run tests of autocorrelation for the error term 
in order to exclude dynamic mechanisms in the leverage. 
14
 As clear from Table 3, this is always the case in the Leverage equation for few subpopulations, i.e. North East, Small, 
Profit, Loss, where the OLS estimates are upward biased. Notice that the coefficient of ln-ACE benefit is negative.  
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way: if a firm showed positive EBIT in 2008 then it enters the sub-population “Profit”, 
otherwise it enters the subpopulation “Loss”.15 The former enjoys the whole benefit 
whereas the latter has a 50% reduction in ACE relief. 
 
Table 3. ACE elasticity of Leverage. 
 Within-group 
FE %ACE
leverage
∆
∆
 
Pooled-
OLS %ACE
leverage
∆
∆
 
 elasticity FE elasticity OLS 
Mean 
Sales 
(TH 
euro) 
%
Sales
ACE
 
       
Average -0.064 (.0015) -3.2 (.8729) -0.062 (.0391) -3.1§ (1.957) 3568.62 0.14 
North West -0.0647 (.0027) -3.2 (.1368) -0.063 (.0294) -3.2* (1.469) 6173.40 0.137 
North East -0.058 (.0032) -2.9 (.1580) -0.061 (.0014) -3.1 (.0714) 3674.65 0.145 
Centre -0.0627 (.0029) -3.1 (.1434) -0.063 (.0019) -3.2 (.0932) 2021.96 0.181 
South -0.071 (.0029) -3.5 (.1448) -0.060 (.0009) -3.0 (.0468) 1470.56 0.116 
Small -0.063 (.0017) -3.1 (.0839) -0.074 (.0246) -3.7 (1.231) 1164.06 0.142 
Medium -0.046 (.0029) -2.3 (.1433) -0.041 (.0034) -2.1 (.1677) 3653.31 0.098 
Large -0.044 (.0068) -2.2 (.3399) -0.015 (.0016) -0.8 (.0811) 57579.49 0.157 
Profit -0.048 (.0016) -2.4 (.0776) -0.056 (.0006) -2.8 (.0282) 4487.55 0.136 
Loss -0.064 (.0027) -3.2 (.1348) -0.071§(.1543) -3.5§ (7.714) 1685.51 0.182 
Manufacture -0.059 (.0037) -2.9 (.1844) -0.047 (.0033) -2.3 (.1636) 5948.99 0.111 
note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. All estimations are statistically significant at 1% level. 
Loss/Profit refer to 2008: if a firm profit is positive in 2008, then it is considered profitable all its time 
span. ∆ACE is the ACE change such that ACE/Sales ratio increases by 50%. Sales are reported in 
thousand euro and are averaged across years and firms overall and within each category. ACE/Sales is 
average ACE over average Sales. Based on 445857 observations. § indicates non significant. 
 
Table 3 reports estimates of the elasticity of leverage with respect to ACE. To give an idea 
of the characteristics of each sub-group considered, the last two columns of Table 3 report 
the within-group average Sales in thousand of euro and the ratio between the ACE benefit 
and sales.  
Column 2 shows the FE estimates of leverage elasticity: there is a negative statistically 
significant relation between the two variables as expected, and the relation is stronger for 
North-Western and Southern firms, small and loss-making firms. Column 4 reports the 
analogous Pooled-OLS estimates, which are quite close, even if with larger standard errors, 
on average.16 Indeed, Pooled-OLS estimate for Losing-profit firms is non significant. 
                                               
15
 In 2008 there are 177310 firms in the sample: 61.65% show positive EBIT in the balance sheet, 38.35% have 
negative or null EBIT. So we use the dummy I(EBIT>0) varying over time and firms as a regressor, while we use 
I(EBIT>0)2008 as a criterion to define the subpopulations ‘Profit’ and ‘Loss’. For those firms observed only in the two 
years 2006-2007 and 2009-2010, we applied the information about positive/negative profit in 2007 and 2009, 
respectively, given that they are the closest years to our benchmark year. 
 
16
 This means that on average unobserved fixed effects are not correlated to explanatory variables. Some distortion 
however is evident for South sub-sample, Small and Large firms, Profitable and Manufacturing. See note 14.  
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In column 3 we calculated the effect of a change in ACE benefit from its initial base on the 
leverage change. We considered a 50% ACE increase such that the ACE/Sales ratio steps 
from 0.14% to 0.21%. As can be seen, the lowest ratio is in the Medium firms sub-sample 
(0.098%), while the highest ratio belongs to firms in the Centre category and to firms with 
earnings loss (0.18%). When applying that increase for all sub-groups, we obtain the 
results on the leverage change, in percentage points, reported in columns 3 and 5. A 
recapitalization aimed at increasing the ACE benefit by 50% is estimated to reduce 
leverage by 3.2% overall. The impact is slightly larger in the South of the country (-3.5%). 
Small firms reduce leverage more than medium and large ones (-3.1%). Loss-making firms 
reduce leverage by 3.2%, whereas profitable firms have a 2.4% decrease. As is clear from 
Table 3, profitable firms show a lower elasticity of leverage than non-profitable firms in 
absolute value, -0.048 and -0.064 respectively, even if OLS estimate for losing firms is not 
statistically significant. This means that, if resources are available, the ACE benefit can 
stimulate loss-making firms more than it does for profitable firms. On aggregate, this 
would improve credit market conditions and, as expected by the IMF, reduce systemic 
risk. 
 
5. Robustness checks 
The vast empirical literature on - the more general - relations between leverage and non-
debt tax shields uses different specifications.17 For this reason, we needed to run some 
robustness checks by changing the specification or the estimator in leverage equation (1). 
In particular we added a set of alternative explanatory variables to eq.(1), for the entire 
sample: size dummies, ln-Sales, “others” including the level of tangible fixed assets (over 
total fixed assets), the level of intangible fixed assets (over total fixed assets), the level of 
EBIT (over total fixed assets), the ratio of inventories to total fixed assets and age.  
Within-group Fixed Effect elasticities are reported in Table 4, column 4. Last column of 
Table 4 shows the change in leverage due to a change in ACE, as before. When we 
substitute ln-Sales to size dummies, the estimated elasticity is only slightly higher in 
absolute value -0.067. This led to a reduction in leverage by 3.4%. Changing variables in 
the specification did not have any significant impact on calculation of elasticities through 
the FE method. However, adding ln-Sales to Pooled-OLS estimations does change the 
estimates, which are upward biased. It is very probable that current individual fixed effects 
are highly correlated with current sales, as discussed in the previous section. As a 
                                               
17
 Besides the papers cited in note 12, we mention, among others, Teker et al. 2009, Kahle and Shastri, 2005, Manuel 
and Pilotte, 1992. All these empirical work use a reduced-form approach. 
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consequence, we proceeded with a second robustness check, by finding instruments for 
sales. We needed to estimate equation (1) by GMM, where Leverage is the dependent 
variable and ln-Sales becomes endogenous (instrumented by lagged ln(Tornqvist index), 
lagged ln(Labor), ln-ACE, area and sector dummies). We also added the set of other 
variables explained above plus age in the main equation. The results for GMM are 
reported in the last panel of Table 4. 
 
Table 4. Robustness checks for the leverage equation. 
Added Variables Obs Elasticity Estimation 
Method 
   benefitACE
leverage
 ∆
∆
 
    % 
SD 437194 -0.064 (0.0015) -3.2 (0.0729) 
lnS 437194 -0.067 (0.0014) -3.4 (0.0724) 
SD+others 437094 -0.064 (0.0015) -3.2 (0.0729) 
lnS+others 437094 -0.068 (0.0015) -3.4 (0.0726) 
SD+others+Age 435180 -0.062 (0.0014) -3.1 (0.0694) 
Fixed effects 
lnS+others+Age 435180 -0.066 (0.0014) -3.3 (0.0691) 
     
SD 437194 -0.063 (0.0391) -3.1 (1.957) 
lnS 437194 -0.082 (0.0049) -4.1 (0.2436) 
SD+others 437094 -0.064 (0.0005) -3.2 (0.0240) 
lnS+others 437094 -0.088§ (1.399) -4.4§ (69.594) 
SD+others+Age 435180 -0.054 (0.0005) -2.7 (0.0249) 
Pooled-OLS 
lnS+others+Age 435180 -0.072 (0.0020) -3.6 (0.1001) 
     
GMM  lnS 250872 -0.063 (0.0019) -3.1 (0.0974) 
 lnS+others 250832 -0.062 (0.0019) -3.1 (0.0971) 
 lnS+others+Age 249742 -0.062 (0.0020) -3.1 (0.0977) 
note: All regressions contain area, profit, sector and time dummies. Other variables are added 
alternatively: SD = Size dummies, lnS = ln(Sales), Age, others (Total Tangible Assets/Total Assets,  
Total Intangible Assets/Total Assets, Inventories/Total Assets, EBIT/Total Assets). 2-step robust  
GMM is applied in the last panel: instruments are ln(ACE benefit), lagged ln(Tornqvist index  
of raw materials + services), lagged ln(Labor), and all common factors. Hansen J statistic  
of over identification cannot reject the null in all three cases (J = 0.10, p-val. 0.748 first case;  
J = 0.07, p-val. 0.798 second case; J = 0.16, p-val. 0.689 third case). § indicates not significantly  
different from zero.  
 
Now, after instrumenting sales, Leverage elasticity to ACE benefit estimated by GMM is 
not significantly different from its FE equivalent. Indeed, the two methods provide very 
similar calculated impacts of an ACE increase on Leverage decrease (see the last column). 
The ACE/Sales ratio increase corresponds, as in Table 3, to 50% of its initial value. This 
would reduce leverage by -3.1%, according to our preferred FE and GMM measures.18  
                                               
18
 We think that our preferred estimates are the within-group FE estimates of Table 3 as far as Leverage is concerned, as 
discussed above, which are robust to changes in specification or estimation method. Adding a new dynamic equation for 
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6. Conclusion 
 
Italy’s ACE is expected to reduce the tax advantage of debt-finance and thus encourage corporate 
capitalization. Using a large and representative sample of Italian firms, we have shown that, on 
average, the elasticity of leverage to the introduction of an ACE benefit would be -0.064, according 
to our preferred FE estimation method. If firms decided to inject further equity to increase the ratio 
between the ACE benefit and sales, say by 50%, the mean leverage would be reduced by 3.2%. 
Nonetheless both elasticity and the impact of an ACE change on leverage depend on location, size, 
health status, and sectors in which firms operate.  
Moreover, our data indicate that the ACE benefit would lead a firm to decrease its tax burden by 
18% to 20%, focusing on the 2007 and 2009 balance sheets, respectively. We can therefore say that, 
despite its gradual implementation, ACE is a step in the right direction, as it encourages firms to 
reduce leverage and therefore cut systemic risk. According to the Government, this may be a 
necessary condition for a higher growth rate in Italy’s economy. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                            
sales (as we tried separately) cannot give further evidence of an indirect effect of an ACE relief on Leverage passing 
through Sales (the estimated impact of ACE on leverage does not change respect to our preferred one-equation results). 
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Appendix 1: Sample selection. 
We based our simulation exercise on balance sheets and financial statements of Italian 
firms collected in the AIDA database, by Bureau van Dijk. As of October 20, 2011 (the 
time in which we downloaded the balance sheets) updated information was available for 
1,215,703 firms. We deleted those firms which did not claim their Italian ATECO 2007 
activity code (2-digit), Region of legal residence or their 2008 Total Value of Production 
and as a consequence, the AIDA universe reduced to 816,934 firms. We selected 15% of the 
universe firms with a stratified method, based on geographical location, activity sectors 
and size. The size of our sample was 122,313 companies, observed over the period 2006-
2010, an unbalanced panel. Figure A1 illustrates the geographical distribution of firm 
frequency (only for limited liability companies, which make the most of the universe) of 
the AIDA universe (grey), the extracted sample (green) and the firms listed on the 
Registro Imprese in 2010, the formal register of the Union of Chambers of Commerce 
(black). We compared our sample distribution with that of Registro Imprese which is an 
external source of information, independent of the Bureau van Dijk. While AIDA database 
tends to slightly over-represent Northern regions and Registro Imprese tends to over-
represent Southern regions, our sample by construction mimics AIDA. The differences 
however were quite marginal and on average the sample satisfactorily represented the 
Italian industrial structure. More than one fifth of the firms are in Lombardy, 15% in 
Lazio, within the capital area, 9% in Veneto, relatively the most industrialized regions in 
Italy as expected. Our sample contains fewer firms with different legal forms, such as 
cooperatives, consortia, etc.. For those small groups we obtained good representation of 
their Registro Imprese counterpart, as well. Unfortunately, we did not have any access to 
Turnover or Total Value of Production of the firms in the Registro Imprese, in order to be 
able to check for size representativeness of our sample. 
 
Figure A1 
Regional distribution of firms %, 2010
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Table A.1 Initial sample distribution 
Sample 2007 2008 2009 
Firms 110690 122305 111749 
 % % % 
North West 30.26 30.00 30.41 
North East 21.42 21.10 21.47 
Centre 25.56 25.52 25.30 
South 22.76 23.38 22.81 
    
Small 82.07 83.20 82.37 
Medium 14.72 13.79 14.50 
Large 3.22 3.00 3.13 
    
Profit 64.61 61.01 59.55 
Loss 35.39 38.99 40.45 
    
Manufacture 15.80 15.44 15.57 
Retail/Wholesale 19.21 19.19 19.11 
 
We further proceeded to eliminate those firms whose balance sheets did not allow us to 
calculate their leverage, or those with missing current sales (2,526 firms). We eliminated 
1,265 firms with just one observation in time (1,260 in 2008 and 5 in 2010), and another 
1,081 observations for missing sales. To avoid outliers, we eliminated extreme leverage 
observations, outside 1-99 percentiles of the distribution (9813 observations). We finally 
eliminated the extreme values of ACE benefit. We ended up with 445,857 total 
observations for 109,175 firms. ACE variable has 437,194 observations and Age was 
observed in 443,907 cases.    
 
Appendix 2: The calculation of the EMTR. 
 
DIT (1998-2003) 
For the Italian DIT, two regimes were considered: the one immediately after the 1998 tax 
reform and the final one. Under the Italian DIT indeed, the favourable tax treatment 
involved only new subscriptions of capital and retained earnings, rather than the whole 
equity capital. The starting point was 1996, when the reform was originally presented by 
the Government. Thus the DIT benefit was nil at the beginning and increased over time as 
new subscriptions and retained earnings from 1996 onwards led to an accumulation of 
equity capital. In doing so, it ensured a "soft" move towards the final regime, under which 
all equity capital would have enjoyed DIT benefit. This gradual implementation was 
necessary to keep a close eye on public accounts, at a time when Italy was trying its best 
to gain access to the first stage of the European Monetary Union. For this reason, the 
average tax rate could not be less than 27%. 
The Government was conscious that DIT would have produced significant benefits only in 
the medium term. Furthermore, it was aware that this mechanism would have guaranteed 
a benefit only to under-capitalized firms, in the event that they rebalanced their 
debt/equity structure. Moreover, the rules encouraged new business initiatives, which 
would fully enjoy DIT relief. In order to enhance DIT relief, a corrective measure, called as 
Super-DIT, was introduced in the year 2000: the increase in capital invested was 
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multiplied by 1.2 in 2000 and 1.4 in the subsequent fiscal years, thereby boosting the DIT 
benefit proportionally. 
    As we pointed out, the Italian DIT tax was repealed in 2003. When the centre-right 
Government came to power in 2001, the attitude towards DIT radically changed. The 
imputation rate was almost immediately aligned to the rate of legal interest, and thus 
halved (declining from 7% to 3.5% first and then to 3%). Furthermore, only equity 
increases until 30th June 2001 were relevant to calculate the incentive, and the Super-DIT 
multiplier was removed. The cut in the imputation rate and the "freezing" of the benefit 
were a clear signal of the future abandonment of the DIT, which occurred at the end of 
2003. 
 
IRAP (1998)  
IRAP is a flat-rate tax levied on the value added generated by all types of business and 
self-employed activities. The tax base is calculated annually from taxpayers’ accounts 
according to a direct subtraction method. Value added is specifically defined for the 
different categories of taxpayers, depending on the type of business activity carried out. 
Specific rules, for example, are established for banks, financial intermediaries and insurance 
companies. 
Apart from these exceptions, most other business activities have their tax base calculated 
as the accounting difference between sales revenue and the costs of intermediate goods and 
services. Neither labour costs nor interest payments are deductible from the tax base. 
Thus, the IRAP tax base is essentially equal to the sum of wages, profits, rents and 
interest payments at the business level. Outlays for capital goods are not immediately 
expensed, but taxpayers may deduct fiscal depreciation allowances from the tax base, 
including accelerated depreciation during the first three years. IRAP may thus be defined 
as a tax on value added of the net income variety.  
Initially, IRAP rate was equal to 4.25%. In 2008 it was reduced to 3.9%. Moreover, in 
2009, 10% of IRAP liability was deductible against IRES for companies with passive 
interest payments or personal costs.   
 
EMTR 
In order to analyze the impact of Italian taxation reforms, we proposed the EMTR values 
for Italian companies from 1998 to 2012. We considered a company that finances one 
project by debt or equity. The focus of this paper is only the holding-company taxation 
and not dividend taxation weighting down shareholders, so it is possible not to consider 
personal taxation, because of the multiplicity of variables related to it. 
According to Bond and Chennells (2000), only capital has been considered and not the 
labor factor. Moreover capital does not depreciate during the time. In order to define the 
effective marginal tax rate (EMTR), we used the traditional standard methodology 
proposed by Devereux and Griffith (1999) and the linked studies of Bond and Chennells 
(2000). 
We have assumed that a project is financed alternatively by equity or debt. The project 
invests one unit of capital, that can generate future profits, but that cannot depreciate 
over time. 
 
1 Fully equity-financed investment  
The first situation is about a company that finances the investment by equity and so the 
related future profits will be obtained through future dividends. Let’s define π as the 
marginal product of capital, i the market interest rate, τ the corporate income tax rate, tr 
the IRAP rate, and R the user cost of capital. 
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In the standard Italian situation, without DIT or ACE, the user cost of capital is derived 
from the following equation that equalize the net dividend on capital marginal unit to the 
opportunity cost without personal taxation: 
.ir =−− piτpiτpi  
The LHS measures the after-tax marginal product of capital, whereas the RHS is equal to 
the (marginal) opportunity cost of capital (i.e., i). Rearranging thus gives: 
,
1
Ri
r
=
−−
=
ττ
pi  
where R is the user cost of capital under full equity finance. 
In order to consider DIT and Super-DIT treatment, we define ρ as the imputed return on 
equity, m the Super-DIT multiplier, and t the reduced capital income tax rate. The user 
cost of capital is defined from this equation: 
,)( imtm r =−−−− piτρpiτρpi  
which can be rewritten as follows: 
Rtmi
r
=
−−
−−
=
ττ
τρ
pi
1
)(
 
Since 2012, an ACE-type relief has been coming into force. Defining e as the ACE 
imputation rate, the user cost of capital is equal to 
 
ier =−−− )(piτpiτpi  
Rearranging thus gives: 
.
1
Rei
r
=
−−
−
=
ττ
τ
pi  
As can be seen, even if e = i, a distortion arises due to IRAP (see Bordignon et al. 1999). 
 
2 Fully debt-financed investment  
In order to define cost of capital related to investment financed by equity, we have 
considered the same project analyzed in the previous paragraph. 
Now the project is financed by debt, so company will return capital and related interests.  
In this scenario, we calculate the after-tax return under debt finance. Since there are no 
opportunity costs we thus obtain: 0)( =−−−− ii r piτpiτpi . Solving for pi gives the user cost 
of capital (LHS) 
Ri
r
=
−−
−
= )1(
)1(
ττ
τ
pi  
This formula holds until 2008. Since 2009, 10% of IRAP tax liability due to borrowing is 
deductible from the IRES base. Therefore, the after-tax marginal product of capital is 
equal to  
,0)1.0( =−−−−− rr ii piτpiτpiτpi  
where piτ r1.0  is the IRES tax benefit arising from the partial deductibility of IRAP tax burden. 
Rearranging one obtains: 
Ri
rr
=
+−−
−
=
ττττ
τ
pi
1.01
)1(
 
 
3 The EMTRs 
Over the 1998-2012 period the Italian system has been modified several times. For this 
reason, in Table A2, we report the relevant parameters regarding both the DIT and the 
ACE system. In Table A3, we calculate the EMTR series, under either full equity- and 
debt-finance. 
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Table A.2: Italy’s tax parameters 
 DIT Tax rates  
Year 
reduced 
capital 
income tax 
rate 
Super-
DIT 
multiplier 
imputed 
return on 
equity 
Corporate income 
tax rate 
IRAP tax 
rate 
1998 19,00% 1 7,00% 37% 4,25% 
1999 19,00% 1 7,00% 37% 4,25% 
2000 19,00% 1,2 7,00% 37% 4,25% 
2001 19,00% 1,4 3,50% 36% 4,25% 
2002 19,00% 1 3,00% 36% 4,25% 
2003 19,00% 1 3,00% 34% 4,25% 
2004    33% 4,25% 
2005    33% 4,25% 
2006    33% 4,25% 
2007    33% 4,25% 
2008    27,50% 3,90% 
2009    27,50% 3,90% 
2010    27,50% 3,90% 
2011    27,50% 3,90% 
2012    27,50% 3,90% 
 
Table A.3: EMTR values, under either fully equity- or debt-finance.  
EQUITY DEBT 
Year EMTR Treatment Year EMTR Treatment 
1998 27,32% DIT 1998 7,23% Standard** 
1999 27,32% DIT 1999 7,23% Standard* 
2000 18,74% DIT 2000 7,23% Standard* 
2001 39,48% DIT 2001 7,11% Standard* 
2002 50,29% DIT 2002 7,11% Standard* 
2003 47,37% DIT 2003 6,88% Standard* 
2004 59,36% Standard*  2004 6,77% Standard* 
2005 59,36% Standard* 2005 6,77% Standard* 
2006 59,36% Standard* 2006 6,77% Standard* 
2007 59,36% Standard* 2007 6,77% Standard* 
2008 45,77% Standard* 2008 5,69% Standard* 
2009 45,77% Standard* 2009 5,52% 10% IRAP** 
2010 45,77% Standard* 2010 5,52% 10% IRAP** 
2011 45,77% Standard* 2011 5,52% 10% IRAP** 
2012 21,72% ACE 2012 5,52% 10% IRAP** 
* Standard means that a standard corporate income tax (named IRES since 2004) is applied. 
** 10% IRAP means that a 10% deduction of IRAP liability against the corporate income tax is ensured. 
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